On the definition and nature of fiscal coercion by Tridimas, George & Winer, Stanley
  
Forthcoming in Richard Wagner (ed.) James M. Buchanan: A Theorist of Political Economy 
and Social Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
 
On the definition and nature of fiscal coercion 
 
George Tridimas, Ulster University, Belfast 
Stanley L. Winer, Carleton University, Ottawa 
 
November 10, 2018 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We introduce ideas about how coercion in public finance can be formally defined, building on 
recent work in the literature. Our discussion illustrates the connection between selected aspects 
of this research and earlier seminal work on coercion by Wicksell, Lindahl, and Buchanan and 
Tullock. We also attempt to contribute modestly towards a fuller understanding of the nature of 
coercion in a public finance setting. We use a Lindahl solution as the counterfactual social state 
relative to which coercion inherent in any situation is to be judged in order to evaluate and 
compare the nature of coercion imposed by a social planner and in an electoral equilibrium. 
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1.  Introduction 
In this chapter we introduce some ideas about coercion in public finance using recent work in the 
literature as a foundation, while briefly illustrating the connection between selected aspects of 
this research and earlier seminal work on coercion by Wicksell, Lindahl, and Buchanan and 
Tullock. We also attempt to contribute modestly towards a fuller understanding of the nature of 
coercion in a public finance setting.  
 Coercion in public finance arises from two essential sources: (i) external control of 
individuals and that of the country exercised through threats of violence and sanctions; and (ii) as 
a by-product of the compromises that citizens must agree to in a democratic society. In this 
chapter we focus on the second source or type of coercion, assuming that the fiscal systems we 
consider are compatible with a stable democratic society in which the state has a legitimate and 
constitutionally circumscribed monopoly on violence.
1
 This assumption is of course a big one. 
Nonetheless, as we hope will become clear in what follows, important issues of definition and 
analysis still remain before a full understanding of the nature of coercion in modern fiscal 
systems can be achieved.  
 To fix ideas, it is useful to begin with an example that we have used in earlier work 
(Winer, Tridimas and Hettich 2014, hereafter WTH 2014). Consider a sizeable group of citizens 
who have come together in a room for a common purpose and who must collectively set the 
temperature on a thermostat and pay for the resulting use of energy. Inevitably in such a group, 
some people will be too hot and some too cold, and even those for whom the temperature is just 
right may be unhappy with the balance they face between what they pay and what they get. 
                                                        
1
 This and the next section make use of some ideas from Martinez-Vazquez and Winer, eds. (2014) and Winer 
Tridimas and Hettich (2014). For exploration of the connections between the two fundamental sources of coercion 
and the implications of this relationship for public finance from differing points of view, see Skaperdas (2014) and 
Wallis (2014).   
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Individuals can escape this situation if they move rooms or leave the building that represents the 
collectivity in the example. But if they stay, they must cope with the coercion implied by their 
assent to the collectively made decision. Coercion for any individual in this example - roughly 
speaking, the difference between what they get and what he or she thinks they deserve at the tax-
price that they have to pay -  cannot be avoided whatever practical collective choice process is 
used.  
 Fiscal coercion of this kind, which arises naturally in all liberal democratic societies, is 
one of the foundations of what is perhaps the most famous diagram in Buchanan and Tullock's 
Calculus of Consent (1962, fig 3, p.71). This diagram endogenizes the constitutional choice of a 
decision rule for the making of fiscal and other decisions as the outcome of minimization of the 
sum of two types of costs: expected external costs that fall with the proportion of citizens 
required for a decision to be taken; and expected decision-making costs that rise with this 
proportion. As they also argue, there is no obvious reason why the optimal, cost-minimizing 
solution should require a simple majority.  
 'External costs' in the Calculus of Consent are the equivalent of coercion in our stylized 
example, though they are not referred to as such in the book. Despite the centrality of coercion to 
the Calculus, an exact definition of coercion is not provided nor has it been in their subsequent 
work. More generally, while philosophers and legal experts have explored its nature at length, 
work on coercion in economics has lagged behind that in other disciplines even though a concern 
with it often lies beneath the surface, especially when taxation is involved.  
 The exception in economics is the literature on mechanism design, recently reviewed by 
Ledyard (2014), which is built on the early work of Wicksell (1896) and his student Lindahl 
(1919). The early work was aimed at establishing a fiscal system with public goods that is 
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economically efficient while at the same time minimizing (Wicksell), or even eliminating 
(Lindahl) fiscal coercion. In the mechanism design literature, the objective is similar to that of 
Lindahl's, with participation constraints formally requiring that all equilibria or solutions involve 
the absence of coercion. Whether such a solution with public goods is possible, and how one 
may be achieved under alternative assumptions about what citizens know about each other's 
'type' remains an active area of research.   
 In the next section we briefly summarize our understanding of how fiscal coercion may 
be formally defined and used in fiscal analysis when citizens are constrained to remain in the 
room, so to speak, based on our earlier work. That exit from the community is prevented (or 
prohibitively costly) is a second important underlying assumption of the present analysis. We 
then develop an alternative definition of coercion in section three that aims at insuring the 
aggregate compatibility of individual views about coercion when individual tastes for public 
goods and individual incomes are both heterogeneous as well as correlated, and we explore some 
of its implications for fiscal analysis.       
 
2. The individual-in-society, the individual-as-dictator and imposition of  coercion 
 constraints in a social planning problem 
 
A formal definition of fiscal coercion for an individual requires that a counterfactual be defined, 
so that an actual situation in which a taxpayer finds himself can be compared to one that the 
individual regards as non-coercive.
2
  This counterfactual may be one in which the individual 
receives in public services what he or she thinks they deserve at the tax-price that must be paid, a 
formulation of the counterfactual implicitly used in the example stated earlier, or, analogously, 
one in which he or she pays what they think is appropriate for the public services actually 
                                                        
2
  'Non-coercive' does not necessarily mean that same thing as 'voluntary'. For a deeper discussion of related issues 
in the definition of coercion, see Congleton (2014).   
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provided. The former approach is the one used by Breton (1996) and is implicit, we think, in 
work by Buchanan, for example in his Demand and Supply of Public Goods (1968, 145-146) in 
which he stresses the importance of the individual's recognition that he or she is part of a social 
situation. It is the approach used in WTH (2014). Adoption of a counterfactual in which the 
individual pays what he thinks is appropriate for the services actually received is suggested by 
the work of Lindahl, and is the counterfactual experiment embodied in the computable 
equilibrium study of fiscal coercion in the U.S. state of Georgia by Sehili and Martinez-Vazquez 
(2014).  
 Both of these approaches are part of what we have referred to as individual-in-society 
definitions. To formalize the approach in which the individual takes as given the socially 
determined tax rate  𝑡𝑖 , let 𝑉𝑖
∗ be the maximized utility that a citizen enjoys under specified 
counterfactual conditions, and 𝑉𝑖 be the utility he or she actually enjoys from the operation of the 
public sector. In this individual-in-society approach to defining coercion, the individual 
determines the level of public good G* that maximizes her utility subject to income 𝑌𝑖 that may 
be a function of the tax rate. Coercion is then defined as the difference between the resulting 
counterfactual utility and the utility conferred by the actual fiscal system:  
 
[𝑉𝑖
∗(𝐺𝑖
∗, 𝑌𝑖, 𝑡𝑖) − 𝑉𝑖],     where 𝐺𝑖
∗ = argmax 𝑉𝑖(𝐺, 𝑌𝑖 , 𝑡𝑖)    (1) 
               { 𝐺 } 
 
 A second approach begins with the assumption that appropriate treatment of an individual 
by the fiscal system is what that person would want if he or she was a dictator. This is the 
individual-as-dictator approach, first suggested by Usher.
3
 Coercion is then calculated as the 
difference between utility with the 'dictator's' preferred outcome and the actual utility 
                                                        
3
 Personal communication from Dan Usher.  
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experienced in the world as it is. In a simple version of this approach, the individual–as–dictator 
with income  
𝑌𝑖 determines a proportional tax rate t and the level of the public good G by maximizing utility  
subject to the government budget constraint ∑ 𝑡𝑌𝑖
𝑁
𝑖 = 𝐺, where 𝑁 denotes the number of 
taxpayers. Coercion is calculated as:  
[𝑉𝑖
∗(𝐺∗, 𝑌𝑖, 𝑡
∗) − 𝑉𝑖],  where 𝐺
∗ = argmax 𝑉𝑗(𝐺, 𝑌𝑖,
∑ 𝑌𝑖
𝑁
𝑖
𝑁
)    (2) 
            { 𝐺 } 
 
Hintermann and Rutherford (2017) use this individual-as-dictator definition in a computable 
general equilibrium model to analyse coercion in their study of environmental policy.
4
  
 An additional issue to be decided using either of the two approaches outlined is whether 
only citizens who lose relative to the counterfactual are to be considered coerced, or whether, as 
in WTH 2014, all citizens for whom the differentials above are non-zero are to be included in the 
measure of coercion.  
2.1  Coercion constrained optimal policy 
A society interested in liberty will set limits on the coercion that can be imposed on its individual 
members by the state. Studying the implication of such limits is therefore of interest, and doing 
so is easier if there are analytically tractable definitions of coercion like those illustrated above. 
This brings us to the question of whether to apply coercion constraints at the level of the 
individual, or at some aggregate level.  
 In accordance with Wicksell, who advocated approximate unanimity among groups as a 
way of minimizing coercion, a constraint involving individuals or groups may be specified as 
 𝑉𝑖
∗ − 𝑉𝑖  ≤ 𝐾𝑖  ,         (3) 
where the subscript refers to individuals or to specific social groups.  
                                                        
4 It may be noted that a median voter is essentially a dictator imposing coercion on everyone else.  
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 A more relaxed approach that allows for stronger policy judgments, and a greater degree  
of coercion in whatever allocation emerges, bears some similarity to the Kaldor–Hicks criterion 
for potential compensation (in contrast to the strict Pareto criterion). This involves the use of a 
constraint on the sum of individual utility differences, such as  
 ∑ (𝑉𝑖
∗ − 𝑉𝑖)  ≤ 𝐾𝑖  .        (4) 
 A social planning problem with a simple fiscal system and coercion constraints can be 
written as follows, where F is the social objective:  
 Max 𝐹(𝑉1( 𝑌1, 𝑡, 𝐺), … , 𝑉𝑛( 𝑌𝑛, 𝑡, 𝐺))      (5)  
such that    ∑ 𝑡𝑌𝑖
𝑁
𝑖 = 𝐺   and   {𝑉𝑖
∗ − 𝑉𝑖  ≤ 𝐾𝑖 , ∀ 𝑖     or     ∑ (𝑉𝑖
∗ − 𝑉𝑖)  ≤ 𝐾𝑖 }. 
It may be noted that when an individual-in-society definition of the coercion is used to 
define the counterfactual, the degree of coercion is endogenous in this problem since the 
planner must observe coercion constraints, which affects the choice of fiscal instruments 
and so the nature of coercion in the solution. On the other hand, if an individual-as-dictator 
approach is used, the counterfactual depends only on preferences, technology and endowments, 
and is therefore independent of the planner's objective. 
 It is also interesting to note, as Munger (2014) points out, that Coasian (1960) bargaining 
solves the problem with individual constraints, while economizing on the government's or the 
planner's need to know anything about individual preferences or about what levels of coercion 
are acceptable to the parties involved.
5
 
 Imposing coercion constraints on a social planning problem is one way of investigating 
the implications of limitations on coercion for the nature of optimal fiscal systems. This 
procedure is similar to imposing equity constraints in an inquiry about the kind of tax system that 
                                                        
5
 The issues involved in determining the practicality of Coasian bargaining are well known and will not be 
enumerated here.   
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is best suited to achieving an equitable tax burden. Indeed, investigations of these kinds may be 
regarded as complements in the present context. For Wicksell knowingly avoided the equity 
problem in his seminal pursuit of a fiscal system that is simultaneously efficient and coercion-
minimizing, by assuming at the outset that the problem of distribution had somehow been solved 
before the legislature acted. Whether the related problems of coercion and of equity in tax design 
should be tackled simultaneously or in some specific sequence is an open and longstanding 
question.  
 Any sort of constraint, whether directed at equity or coercion that is imposed on an 
optimizing planner will reduce social welfare (Kaplow, 2001). From a social planning point of 
view, this issue could be dealt with by folding coercion constraints and equity constraints into a 
social welfare function, leading then to an efficient or socially optimal degree of coercion and to 
an efficient degree of inequity. However, doing so may not be the best way to proceed if the 
concerns behind these constraints serve broad social objectives that are not clearly subsumed by 
the usual utilitarian approach to public finance.  
 
3. An individual-as-planner definition of coercion and some of its implications.  
A potential problem with both the individual–in–society and individual–as–dictator definitions is 
that in the counterfactual, each individual desires a different fiscal mix. With individuals having 
different incomes and tastes for the public good, the desired levels of the fiscal instruments are 
almost surely inconsistent with each other in the aggregate. This inconsistency suggests that an 
analysis based on such definitions of coercion contain within them an element of social 
instability. 
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 For this reason, we introduce a third definition of coercion, the difference between 
individual utility in a Lindahl equilibrium and the actual utility conferred by the prevailing fiscal 
mix. This is an example of an individual-as-planner approach to the definition of coercion  
suggested by Boadway (2014). In a Lindahl solution, there is no coercion and all decisions are  
mutually consistent. In this section we specify a simple Lindahl-like equilibrium in which all 
citizens must contribute, and then use this as basis for defining coercion and comparing its nature 
in an optimal tax system and in an electoral equilibrium. In this investigation, individuals are 
heterogeneous; they differ in their (exogenously defined) incomes, tastes for a single pure public 
good, and in their degree of political influence.    
 We begin this comparative analysis with the specification of a simple fiscal system. 
Assume there is a society of 𝑁 citizen–taxpayers indexed by 𝑖. Each individual maximizes a 
Cobb–Douglas utility function defined over private consumption 𝐶𝑖 and a public good 𝐺, has an 
(exogenous) income 𝑌𝑖 and pays a proportional income tax at rate 𝑡. Thus,  
 𝑈𝑖 =  (1 − 𝛼𝑖)𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖𝑙𝑛𝐺 , where  𝐶𝑖 = (1 − 𝑡)𝑌𝑖   (6) 
Here the parameter 0 < 𝛼𝑖 < 1, 𝛼𝑖 ∈ [𝛼𝑚, 𝛼𝑀], 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 0 < 𝛼𝑚, 𝛼𝑀 < 1, denotes the intensity of 
taste for the public good of each citizen-taxpayer, and has mean ?̅? =
∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝑁
𝑖
𝑁
.  
 Normalizing the unit price of the public good to unity, the budget constraint of the 
government is 
∑ 𝑡𝑌𝑖
𝑁
𝑖 = 𝐺.         (7) 
 We note that along with the stability of fiscal institutions and the costliness of exit from 
the community, the exogeneity of incomes is a third major assumption of our analysis.   
3.1 A Lindahl-like solution 
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If coercion is to be eliminated in the Lindahl solution, each person must face a personalized price 
for the public good, 𝜏𝑖, such that  ∑ 𝜏𝑖 = 1
𝑁
𝑖  and such that each person optimizes their own 
welfare at that tax-price with exactly the same level of the public good provided to everyone.   
 Each individual maximizes their utility (6) subject to their Lindahl budget constraint     
𝐶𝑖 + 𝜏𝑖𝐺 = 𝑌𝑖  , leading to the reduced form utility function 
 𝑈𝑖 =  (1 − 𝛼𝑖)𝑙𝑛(𝑌𝑖 − 𝜏𝑖𝐺) + 𝛼𝑖𝑙𝑛𝐺 .     (8) 
Maximization of (7) with respect to 𝐺 gives 𝐺 =
𝛼𝑖𝑌𝑖
𝜏𝑖
 , the size of the public good that 𝑖 prefers at 
the tax-price 𝜏𝑖 . Inverting the latter yields the condition that defines the maximum non-coercive 
tax-price (the demand price) at which every citizen is content with the same, utility maximizing 
level of the public good, that is,   𝜏𝑖 =
𝛼𝑖𝑌𝑖
𝐺
 .  
 Now let the covariance between citizen income 𝑌𝑖 and taste for the public good 𝛼𝑖 be 
written as   
 𝜎𝑌𝛼
2 =
∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑌𝑖
𝑁
𝑖
𝑁
−
∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝑁
𝑖
𝑁
 
∑ 𝑌𝑖
𝑁
𝑖
𝑁
 ,         
where if the rich have less (more) intense tastes for the public good than the poor,  𝜎𝑌𝛼
2 < (>) 0. 
Then using the condition  ∑ 𝜏𝑖 = 1
𝑁
𝑖  (tax-prices sum to 1) and the covariance formula, it can be 
seen that size of the public good in the Lindahl solution 𝐺𝐿 has the general form   
 𝐺𝐿  =  𝑁(?̅??̅? + 𝜎𝑌𝛼
2 ).                                                               (9) 
In view of (9), each individual pays a Lindahl tax of 𝜏𝑖𝐺
𝐿 = 𝛼𝑖𝑌𝑖. 6 
                                                        
6 We may use the latter to calculate an economy-wide average income tax rate as follows. Funding 𝐺𝐿  requires a tax 
revenue of 𝑡 ∑ 𝑌𝑖 = 𝐺
𝐿 𝑁𝑖 which implies that the notional tax rate is  𝑡 =  ?̅? +
𝜎𝑌𝛼
2
?̅?
 . However, this is not the actual rate 
levied on taxpayers in a Lindahl solution. Each individual pays a personalized tax tailored to their preferences.  
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 Substitution of (9) into (6) gives the indirect utility of individual 𝑖 in the Lindahl solution 
that we shall use in our comparison of coercion in the optimal tax and electoral equilibrium 
situations described below:    
 𝑉𝑖
𝐿 =  (1 − 𝛼𝑖)𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝛼𝑖)𝑌𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑁(?̅??̅? + 𝜎𝑌𝛼
2 ).    (10) 
 Before proceeding, it is of interest to derive the analogue to the formula in Buchanan 
(1964) that shows when the Lindahl tax share will rise, remain constant, or fall with income - 
that is, be progressive, proportional or regressive with respect to income.
7
  Given 𝐺𝐿 =
𝛼𝑖𝑌𝑖
𝜏𝑖
 , it 
can be seen that  
𝑑𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐿
𝑑𝑌𝑖
= 
𝑑𝛼𝑖
𝑑𝑌𝑖
1
𝛼𝑖
+
𝑑𝑌𝑖
𝑑𝑌𝑖
1
𝑌𝑖
−  
𝑑𝜏𝑖
𝑑𝑌𝑖
1
𝜏𝑖
 . Since in a Lindahl equilibrium 
𝑑𝐺𝐿
𝑑𝑌𝑖
= 0 , 
because everyone demands the same level of 𝐺, we can multiply through by 𝑌𝑖 to put this in 
elasticity form. Thus we can write: 
𝑑𝜏𝑖
𝑑𝑌𝑖
 
𝑌𝑖
𝜏𝑖
 = 1 +  
𝑑𝛼𝑖
𝑑𝑌𝑖
 
𝑌𝑖
𝛼𝑖
 . In words, in the Lindahl solution, we 
have that the elasticity of the tax share with respect to income = 1 + the elasticity of 𝛼𝑖 with 
respect to income. Thus if the latter elasticity is greater than 0, the Lindahl tax price schedule (if 
we can think of it as such) will be progressive in our model economy. 
3.2 The optimal tax solution 
In the traditional social planner or optimal tax approach (OT), the government sets the 
proportional tax rate in (7) at a level that is completely unconstrained by the coercive character 
of its actions, maximizing a social welfare function that we assume is the unweighted sum of 
individual utilities: 
 𝑆 = ∑ 𝑈𝑖
𝑁
𝑖             (11) 
                                                        
7
 Buchanan (1964) pp. 229-230: “A more general statement of the necessary condition (for a Lindahl solution - our 
addition) is as follows: The income elasticity of demand for the public good divided by the price elasticity of 
demand must be equal to, and opposed in sign to, the income elasticity of the tax-price schedule. Full neutrality is 
present when this condition is met throughout the range of possible incomes.” 
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 Maximizing S with respect to 𝐺 and using (7), we obtain the social welfare maximizing 
size of the public good, and the corresponding proportional tax rate:  
 𝐺𝑂𝑇  =  𝑁?̅??̅?   and 𝑡𝑂𝑇  =  ?̅? .                                               (12) 
The indirect utility of citizen-voter 𝑖 in this optimal tax scheme then can be stated as  
 𝑉𝑖
𝑂 =  (1 − 𝛼𝑖)𝑙𝑛(1 − ?̅?)𝑌𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑁?̅?𝛼 ̅.     (13) 
3.3 An electoral equilibrium 
Before calculating and comparing coercion levels under social planning and in a political  
equilibrium, we must also solve for indirect utility in the electoral equilibrium. When the fiscal 
mix is decided by the outcome of competitive elections, policy outcomes reflect a balancing of 
the heterogeneous economic interests of citizens. This sort of balance can be modeled using a 
probabilistic spatial voting model (see Coughlin 1992, or Mueller 2003). In such a setting, 
electoral equilibrium can be replicated using a Representation Theorem of the sort described by 
Coughlin (1992), by Hettich and Winer (1999) and by others. This involves maximization of a 
synthetic political support function defined over individual indirect utilities, where the weights 
on each citizen's utility reflect their relative political influence in the electoral equilibrium.  
 We proceed assuming that such a representation theorem applies. Let 𝑤𝑖 denote the 
normalized relative political influence of citizen 𝑖 in the electoral equilibrium, so that ∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑁
𝑖 = 1. 
Equilibrium values of  𝐺 and  𝑡 maximize the support function  
 𝑆 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑈𝑖
𝑁
𝑖  .         (14) 
This support function looks like a social welfare function, but it is not. The weights do not reflect 
a normative view about the distribution of welfare, but rather are determined in the Nash 
electoral equilibrium. In this case, in the version of the theorem used here, the outcome also lies 
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on the Pareto frontier, though not the one consistent with the OT solution in which each 
individual's welfare is weighted equally.  
 Let 𝜎𝑤𝛼
2  denote the covariance between citizen influence 𝑤𝑖, and taste for the public 
good 𝛼𝑖,  
 𝜎𝑤𝛼
2 =  
∑ 𝑤𝑖𝛼𝑖
𝑁
𝑖
𝑁
−
∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑁
𝑖
𝑁
∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝑁
𝑖
𝑁
, 
where if those with low (high) 𝛼𝑖 have more political influence, then 𝜎𝑤𝛼
2 < (>)0. Maximizing  
(14) and using 𝜎𝑤𝛼
2  we obtain the equilibrium fiscal system with one pure public good and a 
proportional tax on income: 
 𝐺𝑃  =  𝑁?̅?(?̅? + 𝑁𝜎𝑤𝛼
2 )   and    𝑡𝑃 =   ?̅? + 𝑁𝜎𝑤𝛼
2 .    (15) 
Substituting into the utility function (6) leads to the the indirect utility of voter-taxpayer 𝑖 in this 
electoral equilibrium,  
 𝑉𝑖
𝑃 =  (1 − 𝛼𝑖)𝑙𝑛(1 − ?̅? − 𝑁𝜎𝑤𝛼
2 )𝑌𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑁?̅?(?̅? + 𝑁𝜎𝑤𝛼
2 ).  (16) 
 
4. Who is coerced, and when? 
We now proceed with an analysis of coercion in OT and in the electoral equilibrium using the 
Lindahl solution as the standard of reference to define coercion in each case. We begin with the 
optimal tax solution.  
4.1 Coercion under the OT social planner  
Comparing (10) and (13), we have 
 𝑉𝑖
𝐿 − 𝑉𝑖
𝑂 = (1 − 𝛼𝑖)𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝛼𝑖) − (1 − 𝛼𝑖)𝑙𝑛(1 − ?̅?) + 𝛼𝑖𝑙𝑛 (1 +
𝜎𝑌𝛼
2
?̅??̅?
) (17) 
We may say that when 𝑉𝑖
𝐿 > 𝑉𝑖
𝑂 , citizen 𝑖 is coerced by the social planner. On the other hand, 
when 𝑉𝑖
𝐿 < 𝑉𝑖
𝑂 , citizen 𝑖 benefits from the coercion forced on the rest of the polity. 
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 From (17) we see that the sign of the utility differential  𝑉𝑖
𝐿 − 𝑉𝑖
𝑂 depends crucially on  ?̅? 
relative to 𝛼𝑖, and the sign of 𝜎𝑌𝛼
2 , the correlation between individual incomes and tastes for the 
public good. There are three cases to consider, namely, (i) richer citizens have a relatively lower 
taste for the public good; (ii) the opposite case, where richer citizens have a relatively higher 
taste for the public good; and (iii) the case in which income and preferences for the public good 
are independent.  
(i)  When richer citizens have a relatively lower taste for the public good, 𝜎𝑌𝛼
2 < 0, in which  
case  𝑙𝑛 (1 +
𝜎𝑌𝛼
2
?̅??̅?
) < 0.  Since for small values of 𝛼𝑖  we may use the approximation 
 𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝛼𝑖) ≈ −𝛼𝑖,  the difference in (18) yields the following quadratic equation 
 𝑉𝑖
𝐿 − 𝑉𝑖
𝑂 = 𝛼𝑖
2 − (1 − 𝑙𝑛 (1 +
𝜎𝑌𝛼
2
?̅??̅?
) − 𝑙𝑛(1 − ?̅?)) 𝛼𝑖 − 𝑙𝑛(1 − ?̅?). (18) 
Denoting 𝑙𝑛(1 − ?̅?) ≡ −𝑘; 𝑘 > 0   and   𝑙𝑛 (1 +
𝜎𝑌𝛼
2
?̅??̅?
) ≡ −𝜃;  𝜃 > 0 , (18) can be rewritten as  
 𝑉𝑖
𝐿 − 𝑉𝑖
𝑂 = 𝛼𝑖
2 − (1 + 𝜃 + 𝑘)𝛼𝑖 + 𝑘.     (18) 
Solving the latter yields  𝛼𝑖 =
1
2
[1 + 𝜃 + 𝑘 ± 𝜃√1 +
2(1+𝑘)
𝜃
+
(1−𝑘)2
𝜃2
] . Using the approximation 
√1 + 𝑝𝑥 + 𝑞𝑥2 ≈ 1 +
𝑝
2
𝑥 +
1
2
(𝑞 −
𝑝2
4
) 𝑥2 we obtain the roots  
 𝛼1 =  
𝑙𝑛(1−?̅?)
𝑙𝑛(1+
𝜎𝑌𝛼
2
?̅??̅?
)
> 0  and    𝛼2 = 1 − 𝑙𝑛 (1 +
𝜎𝑌𝛼
2
?̅??̅?
) − 𝑙𝑛(1 − ?̅?) −
𝑙𝑛(1−?̅?)
𝑙𝑛(1+
𝜎𝑌𝛼
2
?̅??̅?
)
 
 Of the above, only the sign of  𝛼1 is unambiguously positive, but at this level of 
generality we cannot tell whether it is larger or smaller than one. As for  𝛼2 , we note that neither 
its sign nor its size is unambiguous. We therefore list all possible combinations and the 
corresponding signs of  𝑉𝑖
𝐿 − 𝑉𝑖
𝑂. Figure 1 below illustrates graphically what is involved in each 
case:  
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(a) 𝛼1 < 1  and  𝛼1 <  𝛼2 < 1 .  Then 
For  0 <  𝛼𝑖 < 𝛼1   ⇒  𝑉𝑖
𝐿  >  𝑉𝑖
𝑂 
For  𝛼1 <  𝛼𝑖 <  𝛼2  ⇒  𝑉𝑖
𝐿  <  𝑉𝑖
𝑂 
For  𝛼2 <  𝛼𝑖 <  1   ⇒  𝑉𝑖
𝐿 >  𝑉𝑖
𝑂 
 (b) 𝛼1 < 1  and  𝛼1 <  1 <  𝛼2 . Then   
For  0 <  𝛼𝑖 <  𝛼1   ⇒  𝑉𝑖
𝐿  >  𝑉𝑖
𝑂 
For  𝛼1 <  𝛼𝑖 < 1   ⇒  𝑉𝑖
𝐿  <  𝑉𝑖
𝑂 
(c) 𝛼1 > 1  and 𝛼2 < 0.   Then     
For  0 <  𝛼𝑖 < 1   ⇒  𝑉𝑖
𝐿  <  𝑉𝑖
𝑂 
(d)  𝛼1 > 1  and 0 < 𝛼2 < 1 .   Then    
or  0 <  𝛼𝑖 <   𝛼2  ⇒  𝑉𝑖
𝐿  >  𝑉𝑖
𝑂 
For   𝛼2 <  𝛼𝑖 < 1  ⇒ 𝑉𝑖
𝐿  <  𝑉𝑖
𝑂 
(e)  𝛼1 > 1  and 𝛼2 > 1 . Then    
For  0 <  𝛼𝑖 < 1   ⇒  𝑉𝑖
𝐿  >  𝑉𝑖
𝑂. 
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(ii)  When rich people have a higher taste for the public good, we have  𝜎𝑌𝛼
2 > 0 . In this case 
𝑙𝑛 (1 +
𝜎𝑌𝛼
2
?̅??̅?
) > 0.  Since for small values of 𝛼𝑖  we may use the approximation 𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝛼𝑖) ≈ 
−𝛼𝑖 , the difference in (18) yields the following second order polynomial  
 𝑉𝑖
𝐿 − 𝑉𝑖
𝑂 = 𝛼𝑖
2 − (1 − 𝑙𝑛 (1 +
𝜎𝑌𝛼
2
?̅??̅?
) − 𝑙𝑛(1 − ?̅?)) 𝛼𝑖 − 𝑙𝑛(1 − ?̅?). (19) 
Working as above, the roots of the quadratic equation are 
 𝛼1 =  
𝑙𝑛(1−?̅?)
𝑙𝑛(1+
𝜎𝑌𝛼
2
?̅??̅?
)
< 0  and  𝛼2 = 1 − 𝑙𝑛 (1 +
𝜎𝑌𝛼
2
?̅??̅?
) − 𝑙𝑛(1 − ?̅?) −
𝑙𝑛(1−?̅?)
𝑙𝑛(1+
𝜎𝑌𝛼
2
?̅??̅?
)
  . 
The negative root  𝛼1 does not make economic sense.  We then have 
(a)  𝛼1 < 0  and 𝛼2 < 0.  Then    
For  0 <  𝛼𝑖 < 1   ⇒  𝑉𝑖
𝐿 >  𝑉𝑖
𝑂  
(b)  𝛼1 < 0  and 0 <  𝛼2 <  1 .  Then    
For  0 <  𝛼𝑖 < 𝛼2   ⇒  𝑉𝑖
𝐿 <  𝑉𝑖
𝑂  
 For  𝛼2 < 𝛼𝑖 < 1   ⇒  𝑉𝑖
𝐿 >  𝑉𝑖
𝑂 
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(c) 𝛼1 < 0  and 0 < 1 <  𝛼2 .  Then    
 For  0 <  𝛼𝑖 < 1   ⇒  𝑉𝑖
𝐿 <  𝑉𝑖
𝑂. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates these cases. 
 
(iii)  In the case where income and preferences for the public good are independent of each 
other,  𝜎𝑌𝛼
2 = 0 , so that (17) yields 
 𝑉𝑖
𝐿 − 𝑉𝑖
𝑂 = (1 − 𝛼𝑖)(𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝛼𝑖) − 𝑙𝑛(1 − ?̅?)) > (<) 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝛼𝑖 < (>) ?̅? .  (20) 
That is, taxpayers with a public good taste smaller than the mean  ?̅?  lose in the counterfactual 
relative to OT. 
 Figure 3 shows graphically what is involved when 𝜎𝑌𝛼
2 = 0 and we count as coerced only 
those who lose relative to the Lindahl counterfactual. The difference between utility under the 
counterfactual, Lindahl-like solution and the optimal tax one is drawn against the intensity of 
taste for the public good from lower to higher.  Coercion is highest when the taste for 𝐺 takes its 
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lowest value 𝛼𝑚, and declines thereafter up to a threshold value ?̅?. For individuals with 𝛼𝑖 >  ?̅?, 
utility under the OT planner rises as their taste for the public good increases.  
 
Figure 3. Coercion in OT when income and taste for the public good 
are independent of each other (𝝈𝜶𝒀
𝟐  = 0).  Coercion = V
L
i  – V
O
i > 0. 
Vi
L – Vi
O
am
a
Coercion under
Optimal taxation
aM ai
 
4.2 Coercion in an electoral equilibrium 
Working as before, we obtain 
 𝑉𝑖
𝐿 − 𝑉𝑖
𝑃 = (1 − 𝛼𝑖)𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝛼𝑖) − (1 − 𝛼𝑖)𝑙𝑛(1 − ?̅? − 𝑁𝜎𝑤𝛼
2 ) + 𝛼𝑖𝑙𝑛 (
?̅??̅?+𝜎𝑌𝛼
2
?̅??̅?+𝑁?̅?𝜎𝑤𝛼
2 ) .   (21) 
As with equation (17), the sign of (21) is ambiguous and depends on  ?̅? relative to 𝛼𝑖, the sign 
of 𝜎𝑌𝛼
2 , the correlation between individual incomes and tastes for the public good, as well as the 
correlation between political influence and taste for the public good, 𝜎𝑤𝛼
2 . With each one of 
 𝜎𝑌𝛼
2  and  𝜎𝑤𝛼
2  taking positive, zero and negative values, we have a total combination of nine 
possible constellations, each one leading to a number of sub-cases. So to go forward, we simplify 
further.  
 If it is plausible that the rich have lower intensity of preferences for the public good, we 
have 𝜎𝑌𝛼
2 < 0 . If it is further assumed that those with a high taste for 𝐺 are also politically more 
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influential - that is, that the poor have greater influence than the rich, then 𝜎𝑤𝛼
2 > 0 . We then 
have  𝑙𝑛(1 − ?̅? − 𝑁𝜎𝑤𝛼
2 ) < 0 and 𝑙𝑛 (
?̅??̅?+𝜎𝑌𝛼
2
?̅??̅?+𝑁?̅?𝜎𝑤𝛼
2 ) < 0. Using the latter, the expression in (21) 
yields a quadratic equation similar to (18) and a similar range of solutions.  
 On the other hand, if the rich have lower intensity of preferences for the public good and 
they are also politically more influential or, equivalently, those with low taste for the public good 
are more influential, so that 𝜎𝑤𝛼
2 < 0 , expression (21) yields the quadratic equation  
 𝑉𝑖
𝐿 − 𝑉𝑖
𝑃 = 𝛼𝑖
2 − (1 − 𝑙𝑛(1 − ?̅? − 𝑁𝜎𝑤𝛼
2 ) − 𝑙𝑛 (
?̅??̅?+𝜎𝑌𝛼
2
?̅??̅?+𝑁?̅?𝜎𝑤𝛼
2 )) 𝛼𝑖 − 𝑙𝑛(1 − ?̅? − 𝑁𝜎𝑤𝛼
2 )    (22) 
The roots of (22) are  
 𝛼1 =  
𝑙𝑛(
?̅??̅?+𝜎𝑌𝛼
2
?̅??̅?+𝑁?̅?𝜎𝑤𝛼
2 )
𝑙𝑛(1−?̅?−𝑁𝜎𝑤𝛼
2 )
− 𝑙𝑛(1 − ?̅? − 𝑁𝜎𝑤𝛼
2 ) − 𝑙𝑛 (
?̅??̅?+𝜎𝑌𝛼
2
?̅??̅?+𝑁?̅?𝜎𝑤𝛼
2 ) and   
 𝛼2 = 1 −
𝑙𝑛(
?̅??̅?+𝜎𝑌𝛼
2
?̅??̅?+𝑁?̅?𝜎𝑤𝛼
2 )
𝑙𝑛(1−?̅?−𝑁𝜎𝑤𝛼
2 )
 . 
For concreteness we assume  
𝑙𝑛(
?̅??̅?+𝜎𝑌𝛼
2
?̅??̅?+𝑁?̅?𝜎𝑤𝛼
2 )
𝑙𝑛(1−?̅?−𝑁𝜎𝑤𝛼
2 )
> 0 and (1 − ?̅? − 𝑁𝜎𝑤𝛼
2 ) > 0 . A total of six cases 
are then possible as described below: 
(i.a) 0 <  𝛼2 < 1 and 𝛼1 < 0 . Then 
 For 0 < 𝛼𝑖 < 𝛼2  ⟹ 𝑉𝑖
𝐿 − 𝑉𝑖
𝑃 < 0    
For  𝛼2 < 𝛼𝑖 < 1  ⟹ 𝑉𝑖
𝐿 − 𝑉𝑖
𝑃 > 0 
(i.b) 0 <  𝛼2 < 1 and 0 < 𝛼1 < 1 . Then  
 For  𝛼𝑖 < 𝑚𝑖𝑛[𝛼1, 𝛼2]  ⟹ 𝑉𝑖
𝐿 − 𝑉𝑖
𝑃 > 0    
For  𝛼𝑖 ∈ [𝛼1, 𝛼2]  ⟹ 𝑉𝑖
𝐿 − 𝑉𝑖
𝑃 < 0    
For 𝛼𝑖 > 𝑚𝑎𝑥[𝛼1, 𝛼2] ⟹  𝑉𝑖
𝐿 − 𝑉𝑖
𝑃 > 0    
 (i.c) 0 <  𝛼2 < 1 and 𝛼1 > 1 . Then 
 For 𝛼𝑖 < 𝛼2  ⟹ 𝑉𝑖
𝐿 − 𝑉𝑖
𝑃 > 0    
For  𝛼2 < 𝛼𝑖 < 1  ⟹ 𝑉𝑖
𝐿 − 𝑉𝑖
𝑃 < 0 
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(ii.a) 𝛼2 < 0  and 𝛼1 < 0 . Then 
 For 0 < 𝛼𝑖 < 1  ⟹ 𝑉𝑖
𝐿 − 𝑉𝑖
𝑃 > 0    
(ii.b) 𝛼2 < 0  and 0 < 𝛼1 < 1 . Then  
 For  0 <  𝛼𝑖 < 𝛼1   ⟹ 𝑉𝑖
𝐿 − 𝑉𝑖
𝑃 < 0    
For  𝛼1 < 𝛼𝑖 < 1  ⟹ 𝑉𝑖
𝐿 − 𝑉𝑖
𝑃 > 0     
(ii.c)  𝛼2 < 0 and 𝛼1 > 1 . Then 
 For 0 < 𝛼𝑖 < 1  ⟹ 𝑉𝑖
𝐿 − 𝑉𝑖
𝑃 < 0 .   
 
4.3  A comparison of OT and electoral equilibrium 
Finally we compare coercion with the OT solution and in an electoral equilibrium by considering 
the welfare differentials (17) and (21). We might expect coercion under a social planner to 
always exceed that in the electoral equilibrium, because the social planner is allowed to coerce 
anyone to any extent, as a matter of social solidarity, as long as social welfare increases.  
 However, this generalization does not hold in our simple model. After substituting from 
(17) and (21) and manipulating, we see that if  𝜎𝑤𝛼
2 < (>) 0 , when 
  𝛼𝑖 >
𝑙𝑛(1−?̅?)−𝑙𝑛(1−?̅?−𝑁𝜎𝑤𝛼
2 )
𝑙𝑛(1−?̅?)−𝑙𝑛(1−?̅?−𝑁𝜎𝑤𝛼
2 )+𝑙𝑛(?̅?+𝑁𝜎𝑤𝛼
2 )−𝑙𝑛?̅? 
    
it is the case that  𝑉𝑖
𝐿 − 𝑉𝑖
𝑂 < (>) 𝑉𝑖
𝐿 − 𝑉𝑖
𝑃 .  So coercion for an individual under the social 
planner may be lower or higher than in our democracy. Of course  𝑉𝑖
𝐿 − 𝑉𝑖
𝑂 = 𝑉𝑖
𝐿 − 𝑉𝑖
𝑃  when 
𝜎𝑤𝛼
2 = 𝜎𝑌𝛼
2 = 0.  
4.  Concluding remarks  
Social interaction necessarily requires limits on individual choices. As soon as we are part of a 
group, various opinions must be heard and compromises must be made. Difficult questions will 
inevitably arise about how limits to individual actions are to be determined, how such limits or 
rights are to be defined, and how they will be enforced once agreement on their nature is 
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achieved. Coercion of the individual by the group is an inevitable outcome of our struggle to deal 
with these issues.    
 Although coercion is therefore essential to, and plays a key role in the Calculus of 
Consent, it has not been well-defined or studied extensively in economics. A careful definition 
requires the use of a counterfactual, non-coercive social state against which the coercion inherent 
in any particular situation is to be judged. We have outlined three different approaches to the 
choice of a counterfactual in the fiscal context: the individual-as-dictator, in which the 
counterfactual is what the individual would want if they alone decided everything; the 
individual-in-society, in which the counterfactual is what the individual would like to pay (or, to 
have in public services) taking as given the socially determined level of public goods (the 
socially determined tax rate they must pay); and the individual-as-planner counterfactual, which 
we have tentatively explored in this chapter. In the individual-as-planner approach, in contrast to 
the other approaches, all counterfactual positions are explicitly required to be mutually 
consistent. The Lindahl solution serves as one obvious choice for such a counterfactual, and it is 
the one that we have employed in our preliminary investigation.   
 Our analysis of the individual-as-planner approach to coercion has led to somewhat 
complex results about the nature of fiscal coercion. In the OT solution, if we treat only those who 
lose relative to the counterfactual as being coerced, the extent of coercion depends entirely on the 
nature of an individual's taste for the public good relative to a critical threshold that depends on 
average tastes, average income and the correlation of tastes and income. The sign of the 
correlation of income and tastes determines how low or high taste citizens fare relative to the 
counterfactual. In the electoral equilibrium, there is also a critical level that can be compared to 
an individual's taste for public goods to determine the nature of coercion, but now (and not 
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surprisingly) the threshold taste level depends on the correlation of income and political 
influence as well as the correlation of income and tastes.  
 Some statements can be made about the comparative nature of coercion in OT and in the 
electoral equilibrium; in particular, it is not the case that the (coercion-unconstrained) social 
planner will always impose more coercion than occurs in the electoral equilibrium. But simple 
general rules about what does happen do not seem possible even in the stripped down model we 
have explored. Perhaps others can find sensible assumptions that lead to more definite results. 
 The analysis we have conducted is subject to two fundamental assumptions: that the 
power of the state is suitably restrained; and that exit from the community is prohibitively 
expensive. In addition, we have assumed that income is determined independently of the fiscal 
system. A full analysis of coercion in public finance and, in this respect, of the calculus of 
consent, awaits a more complete analysis that relaxes these assumptions while deriving general 
propositions about coercion that are relevant to modern fiscal systems.  
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